


CBMs AND THEIR ROLE IN DIFFUSING TENSION ALONG LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL (LAC)



DRAGON'S DEN

The 3,488-km-long border that India shares with China stretches from the India-China-Myanmar tri-junction in the east to the Karakoram Pass in the west. Here are the historical hotspots



THE BOUNDARY




CHINA-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE

'Line' of Actual Control held by Chinese forces in November 1959.


▨ Area claimed by China.

Line separating Indian and Chinese forces on September 7, 1962.

LINE SEPARATING INDIAN AND CHINESE FORCES ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1962



The map below shows the line separating the Indian and Chinese forces on September 7, 1962, in the Eastern Sector. The line was the same as the natural and traditional border of India in the sector, which was formalised under the Simla agreement of 1914 and came to be known as the McMahon Line. The map also shows the Chinese claim line in this sector.





The present state of things



Line connecting posts established by China in November 1959

Line of contact on September 7, 1962

Area occupied by the Chinese since before September 7, 1962

Chinese claim line of 1960
Area actually reached after October 1962

HISTORICAL MAPS - CHINA




POSTAL MAP OF CHINA : 1917



The McMahon Line






[Click here to enlarge]

KEY CERTAINTIES

- **INDIA- RISING, RESPONSIBLE, REGIONAL POWER- QUEST FOR UNSC.**
- **BOUNDARY QUESTION - NO EARLY RESOLUTION, IN SPITE SHIFT IN POSITION- PRESIDENT XI, SEP 2013.**
- **NO COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF LAC- PM MODI.**
- **INCREASE IN INTRUSIONS- MORE ASSERTIVE CHINA.**
- **ENSURE P&T.**

KEY CERTAINTIES

- **COLLABORATIVE AND COLLUSIVE - PAKISTAN.**
- **ABILITY AND CAPABILITY TO BUILD APPLY AND SUSTAIN REQUISITE COMBAT POWER- SINGLE SEASON.**
- **CAPABILITY GAP WILL KEEP INCREASING.**
- **WILL EXPLOIT ASYMMETRIC, HYBRID WARFARE.**
- **CHINA - MULTIDIMENSIONAL , MULTIMODAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN TIBET.**



KEY CERTAINTIES

- **ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCIES CONTRIBUTE TO P&T.**
- **CHINA RESPECTS STRENGTH.**

NO REPEAT OF 1962 POSSIBLE.

KEY UNCERTAINTIES

- **IMPACT OF POLITICO- ECONOMIC- MIL SHIFT, ASIA AS THE PIVOT- REBALANCE.**
- **IS SITUATION IN TIBET & XINJIANG.**
- **WHAT AFTER DALAI LAMA?**
- **COLLABORATIVE AND COLLUSIVE SUPPORT BY CHINA TO PAKISTAN.**

KEY UNCERTAINTIES

- INDIA - CHINA - COOPERATION AND COMPETITION.
- IMPACT OF CPEC AND ONE BELT ONE ROAD.
- STRING OF PEARLS/ BIND TO BALANCE.
- MEDIA.

LAC INCIDENT - SPIRAL INTO A CONFLICT

CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

PAKISTAN

Long Term Alignment

Length 2,442 km

Route-1 via Quetta

Length 2,674 km

Route-2 Via Indus Highway

Length 2,756

Route-3 Via Motorway

Length 2,781 km



National Highway Network

Main Cities
National Highways
Motorways

KEY UNCERTAINTIES

- INDIA - CHINA - COOPERATION AND COMPETITION.
- IMPACT OF CPEC AND ONE BELT ONE ROAD.
- STRING OF PEARLS/ BIND TO BALANCE.
- MEDIA.

LAC INCIDENT - SPIRAL INTO A CONFLICT

CHINA STRATEGY

- DRIVERS FOR CONFLICT??????????
- DISSUASIVE DETERRENCE, CREDIBLE !!!!
- STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA
- BIND TO BALANCE- STRING OF PEARLS VS DIAMONDS.
- BUILDING CAPABILITIES , ENHANCING CAPACITIES. MSC.

WAR PREVENTION


TRANSGRESSIONS- PLA

2010	-	228
2011	-	213
2012	-	426
2013	-	411
2014	-	334


(AUG)





THE LINES



WHAT USED TO HAPPEN



WHAT HAS HAPPENED NOW



Lines approximate
Map not to scale

- Aksai Chin total area: **38500sqkm approx**
- In Indian possession: **1500sqkm approx**
- Johnson Line, drawn in 1865 by the British, is the original boundary that India claims
- McCartney McDonald Line, drawn in 1899, was at one point claimed by the Chinese as the boundary

PANCHSHEEL AGREEMENT - APR 1954

- Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
- Mutual non-aggression
- Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
- Equality and mutual benefit
- Peaceful coexistence

Maintenance of P&T Along the LAC In The India China Border Areas - Agreement Sep 1993

- Focussed on evolving a framework of CSBMs.
- Asia's first major agreement on conventional military disengagement, resulted in effecting actual disarmament (not just arms control) without any role played by third countries.
- Est Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question.
- Eighth Round in New Delhi (August 1995) agreed to dismantle four closest military posts on the border and setting up four border trade posts.
- Est of Border Personnel Meeting Points.
- References to the LAC without prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD ALONG LAC IN INDIA- CHINA BORDER AREAS- NOV 1996

- **“No War” Pact between China and India despite major disagreements on their boundary question - ARTICLE 1 - Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side. No armed forces deployed by either side in the border areas along the LAC as part of their respective military strength shall be used to attack the other side, or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquillity and stability in the India-China border areas.**
- **Marks the beginning of major initiatives in actually resolving the border dispute - ARTICLE 2 - The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a *fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question.* Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question, the two sides reaffirm their commitment to strictly respect and observe the line of actual control in, the India-China border areas, No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.**

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD ALONG LAC IN INDIA- CHINA BORDER AREAS- NOV 1996

- **If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-to-face situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.**

POLITICAL PARAMETERS & GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY Q- APR 2005

- **Foster a long-term constructive and cooperative partnership on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns and aspirations, and equality.**
- **The differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.**

POLITICAL PARAMETERS & GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY Q- APR 2005

- The two sides will give due consideration to each other's strategic and reasonable interests, and the *principle of mutual and equal security*.
- Take into account, inter alia, historical evidence, national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of border areas.

POLITICAL PARAMETERS & GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY Q- APR 2005

- The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to be mutually agreed upon between the two sides
- In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall *safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the Border areas.*

BORDER DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT- OCT 2013

- **Firmly believing that the India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity serves the fundamental interests of the people of the two countries.**
- **Reiterating that neither side shall use its military capability against the other side and that their respective military strengths shall not be used to attack the other side.**
- **Reaffirming that neither side shall use or**

BORDER DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT- OCT 2013

- **Having accepted the principle of mutual and equal security**
- **The two sides may establish Border Personnel Meeting sites in all sectors, as well as telephone contacts and telecommunication links at mutually agreed locations along the LAC. Establishing a Hotline between the military headquarters of the two countries.**
- **Shall not follow or tail patrols of the other side**

BORDER DEFENCE COOPERATION **AGREEMENT- OCT 2013**

In case a doubtful situation arises with reference to any activity by either side in border areas where there is no common understanding of the line of actual control, either side has the right to seek a clarification from the other side. In such cases, the clarification shall be sought and replies to them shall be conveyed through any of the mechanisms established under Article III of this Agreement

INTRUSIONS - HIGH PROFILE VISITS

- Feb 1997: intruded 6 kms across Himachal Pradesh, subsequent to former PRC President Jiang Zemin's visit to India in November 1996. The incident happened despite the November 1996 agreement.
- 26 JUN 2003: intruded in Asaphila, Arunachal Pradesh, one of the eight known pockets of dispute. The incident happened when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee was on an official visit to Beijing.
- May 2005: PLA intruded into Asaphila again. The incident happened after former Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005 and despite India-China Protocol on "Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC in India-China Border Areas", signed during Wen's visit. (The Chinese side denied the incident).

INTRUSIONS - HIGH PROFILE VISITS

November 2006: The then PRC President Hu Jintao visited India. Prior to that, the PRC Ambassador to India affirmed that “the whole of the so-called state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that”.

December 2010: Prior to Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visit, Beijing denied visa to Northern Army Commander and began issuing stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir.

INTRUSIONS - HIGH PROFILE VISITS

April 2013 – May 2013: Chinese intruded in Depsang plains of Aksai Chin. The PLA also intruded in Chaglagam area in Arunachal Pradesh. All such intrusions just prior to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's first visit to India (19-21 May 2013).

June 2014: Coinciding with Indian Vice President Ansari's visit to China, the PRC published a map showing the entire Arunachal Pradesh and large chunks of Jammu and Kashmir as Chinese territory.

INTRUSIONS - HIGH PROFILE VISITS

- **September 2014: 1000 PLA troops intruded 3 kms inside India's Chumar territory (LADAKH) . Chumar incident lasted for a week. It reflected a Chinese claim on a new area. It happened ahead of, during and beyond Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to India (17 – 19 Sep. 2014).**
- **23 SEP 2014. President Xi addresses PLA hierarchy, seeks loyalty, exhorts PLA to improve combat readiness and sharpen the ability to win a regional war.**

STRUCTURED MECHANISMS

- **SR LEVEL TALKS**
- **ANNUAL DEFENCE DIALOGUE**
- **WORKING MECHANISM FOR COOPERATION AND COORDINATION**
- **BPMs**
- **HOTLINES**
- **FLAG MEETINGS**

ADDITIONAL CBMs

- **DGMO-HOTLINE**
- **MILITARY EXERCISES- HAND IN HAND**
- **MILITARY EXCHANGES- REGIONAL COMMANDERS, YOUNG OFFICERS, COURSES**
- **NONCONTACT GAMES**
- **INTERACTIONS ALONG LAC**

BPM



THIS IMAGE WAS TWEETED BY @SpokespersonMoD

STRENGTHS - PLA

- Largest Army in the world.
- Time tested structures, decision making at the highest level, CMC has maximum PLA members.
 - Thrust on modernisation has enhanced operational effectiveness by induction of cutting edge technologies.
 - Integral R&D and a responsive military industry.
 - Integrated command and control structures with inbuilt flexibility at military regions.
 - Airborne Corps, Rapid Reaction Forces and SOF.
 - Enhanced PLAF Lift Capabilities.
 - Infrastructure development and logistics installations in Tibet.
- Focus on non contact warfare, cyber warfare, ballistic missiles, anti-satellite warfare, anti-aircraft and anti-ship weaponry , submarines and aircraft carriers.

WEAKNESSES - PLA

- Weak civilian control - only civilian in chain of command is CMC Chairman Xi Jinping.
- PLA forced to support itself post Vietnam conflict - eroded PLA's focus on war fighting while fuelling corruption, smuggling.
- Phenomenon of spoiled children stemming from the one-child policy - risk averse and not tough enough to withstand military discipline.
- Lack of Combat Experience.
- Central authority leads to lack of initiative at all levels as there is a tendency to avoid decision making and pass on decisions up the chain of command in view of the consequences of the fear of failure.
- 40% conscription implies 20% of the 2.3 million PLA is turned over every year. This 20% forms a major part of the frontline troops of Infantry and Mechanised as PLAAF and PLA, Second Artillery and technical arms need more permanency on account of job content and costs involved in training and retention. This weakens the frontline fighting troops.
- Legacy of PLAA domination over PLAAF, PLAN, PAP and Militia.